



February 27, 2008

Dear Market Participants and Interested Parties:

**Re: Letter of Notice – Proposed T-Reg Section 18 Rules**

Pursuant to Section 2(1) of the Alberta Utilities Commission (“Commission”) Rule 17, the Alberta Electric System Operator (“AESO”) is providing notice and seeking feedback on ISO Rule changes that are being considered for recommendation to the AESO Executive Rules Committee (“ERC”) in April 2008.

As outlined in our [letter](#) of February 25, 2008, the proposed ISO Rules contain significant differences from the AESO Recommendation Paper - Transmission Regulation Section 18 dated December 19, 2007, and a stakeholder meeting has been scheduled for March 7, 2008 to review and discuss the differences.

For your consideration, attached are the proposed ISO Rule changes. If you are interested in a particular ISO Rule, the following grid is hyperlinked to provide assistance in directing you to the ISO Rule of interest.

<b>Rule Number</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Level</b>	<b>Most relevant stakeholder interest</b>
G1 Definitions, ISO Rule 5, 6, 8, Appendix 7	<a href="#">T-Reg Section 18 Rules</a>	I	All market participants

Please see the attached summaries for more information on these proposed ISO Rule changes. *Each identified change provides a brief explanation of the reason for the change.*

Comments and suggestions on the ISO Rule changes being proposed are encouraged. Please use the comment matrix provided when submitting comments to the AESO on the proposed ISO Rule changes. Click [here](#) to access the comment matrix for the proposed ISO Rule changes. Only written comments will be considered in finalizing the ISO Rule changes.

Please provide feedback or questions by **Wednesday, March 19, 2008** to the individual specified within the ISO change description below.




The AESO will be publishing all stakeholder comments received for industry review shortly after the comment deadline. Stakeholder comments received along with AESO responses will be published with the final proposed ISO Rule changes being submitted to the ERC for approval in April 2008.

Yours sincerely,

*Original Signed By*

Paul Glatthor  
Senior Coordinator, Rules  
Ph: (403) 539-2464  
E-mail: [paul.glatthor@aeso.ca](mailto:paul.glatthor@aeso.ca)





## Proposed LEVEL I ISO Rule Changes

Level I changes are changes that have a significant operational or financial impact on the industry or the AESO. These changes typically require working group input and/or extensive stakeholder consultation to implement an effective solution.

<b>T-Reg Section 18 Rules</b>	
Rule Section/Number	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. G1 Definitions – long lead time energy, long lead time generating asset</li> <li>2. 5.1.2 Outage Coordination</li> <li>3. 6.3.5 Long Lead Time Energy Dispatches and Directives</li> <li>4. 6.3.6.2 Conditions for Dispatch Down Service Dispatch</li> <li>5. 6.3.6.3 Determining Dispatch Down Service Dispatch Quantity</li> <li>6. 8.1.1 Settlement at Pool Price</li> <li>7. 8.4.2 Final Pool Statement</li> <li>8. Appendix 7 – Compensation For Long Lead Time Energy Directives and Generator Outage Cancellation or Re-Scheduling and Reporting</li> </ol>
Reason for Change	<p>The purpose of the proposed ISO Rule changes is to implement the recommendations contemplated in the <i>AESO Recommendation Paper - Transmission Regulation Section 18</i> (click <a href="#">here</a> to see this paper). Certain recommendations were subsequently amended as a result of additional AESO and stakeholder consultation.</p> <p>Section 18 of the Transmission Regulation directs the AESO to</p>

	make rules respecting directions given to owners of generating units requiring that the generating unit operate, exchange electric energy or provide ancillary services, or be made available to operate, exchange electric energy or provide ancillary services and make rules to implement a load curtailment priority plan.
Confidential Provisions	None
Target Effective Date	April 2008
AESO Contact	Market Services, Doug Simpson, <a href="mailto:doug.simpson@aeso.ca">doug.simpson@aeso.ca</a> , (403) 539-2494
From (Current Rule)	To (Proposal)
<p><b>1. G1 Definitions</b></p> <p>No existing definitions</p>	<p><b>1. G1 Definitions</b></p> <p><u><a href="#">“long lead time energy”</a></u> is energy produced by a <u><a href="#">long lead time generating asset</a></u>.</p> <p><u><a href="#">“long lead time generating asset”</a></u> means a <u><a href="#">generating asset</a></u> that requires more than one hour to synchronize or provide its energy to the <b>AIES</b> under normal operating conditions and that is not providing or scheduled to provide all of its energy for reasons other than an <b>outage</b>.</p>
<p><b>2. 5.1.2</b></p> <p>No existing rule</p>	<p><b>2. <u><a href="#">5.1.2 Outage Coordination</a></u></b></p> <p><u><a href="#">An assessment of supply adequacy and transmission security, based on planned generator outage information will be conducted by the ISO during the period of not more than 24 months and not less than real time or the lead time of an individual generating</a></u></p>

asset before taking any actions described herein.

The ISO will in order of sequence, but with each step not mandatory and contingent upon time constraints:

- a) perform reliability assessments based on the **outage** schedules submitted by **generating asset owners**.
- b) notify **pool participants** through the **AESO** website, if the **outage** volumes exceed an acceptable threshold during any period. The **ISO** will use reasonable efforts to post such outage information to the **AESO** website for a minimum of one week.
- c) contact designated **generating asset owner** personnel to request that **outage** plans be reviewed, if the notification in **rule 5.1.2 b)** did not result in an acceptable threshold.
- d) direct the **generating asset owner** to reschedule or cancel an **outage** if **rules 5.1.2 b)** and **5.1.2 c)** did not result in an acceptable threshold.

The ISO will consider canceling an **outage** immediately if the **outage** schedule changes within three months or less of the delivery hour, to ensure an acceptable threshold is maintained.

Where for the purposes of this **rule 5.1.2**, the following applies:

Acceptable threshold as defined in the **ISO** Operating Policies and Procedures.

When deciding to reschedule or cancel a **generating asset's** outage the **ISO** will consider the following:

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><u>i) The impact to the <b>generating asset</b> owner.</u></li> <li><u>ii) The impact to the generating facility.</u></li> <li><u>iii) The effectiveness of rescheduling or canceling the outage in meeting the acceptable threshold</u></li> <li><u>iv) The frequency that a <b>generating asset</b> has had <b>outages</b> rescheduled or cancelled relative to other <b>generating assets</b></u></li> <li><u>v) Whether the <b>outage</b> is beginning or ending and the time duration of the change to the schedule.</u></li> <li><u>vi) The cost of moving the <b>outage</b>.</u></li> </ul>
<p><b>3. 6.3.5 Long Lead Time Energy Dispatch</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) A <b>pool participant</b> with a <b>generating asset</b> that requires more than one hour to synchronize must submit to the <b>ISO</b> the time of day that such <b>generating asset</b> will be synchronized to the <b>AIES</b>.</li> <li>b) Such time of day must represent the physical condition of the <b>generating asset</b> as determined by either the time of the last notice of the <b>generating asset's</b> intention to start or the time of the last <b>dispatch off</b>, as it relates to the <b>operating constraint</b> submitted to the <b>ISO</b> under <b>rule 3.5.3.4</b>. The time of day must be submitted at least two hours prior to the beginning of the <b>settlement interval</b>.</li> <li>c) In accordance with <b>ISO</b> operating policies and procedures, the <b>system controller</b> may request a <b>pool participant</b> to start</li> </ul>	<p><b>3. <u>6.3.5 Long Lead Time Energy Dispatches and Directives</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) <u>Long lead time energy will be declared to the <b>ISO</b>, by a <b>pool participant</b>, upon request by the <b>system controller</b> as per the <b>ISO Operating Policies and Procedures</b>.</u></li> <li>b) <u>A <b>pool participant</b> with a <b>long lead time generating asset</b> that is not synchronized to the <b>AIES</b> must submit to the <b>ISO</b> the time of day that such <b>asset</b> will be synchronized to the <b>AIES</b> in order to have such <b>asset dispatched</b> according to the <b>energy market merit order</b>.</u></li> <li>c) <u>A <b>pool participant</b> with a <b>long lead time generating asset</b> that is already synchronized to the <b>AIES</b> but has <b>long lead</b></u></li> </ul>

up a **generating asset** that requires greater than one hour to start up by a specified **settlement interval**, if the **adequacy** assessment pursuant to **rule 6.3.6** forecasts insufficient supply to meet **AIES demand** during and after such **settlement interval**.

- d) A **pool participant** who has received a request pursuant to **rule 6.3.5 c)** must notify the **system controller** as soon as reasonably practicable after the request whether it intends to start up the **generating asset**.

**time energy** not reflected in its **available capability** due to **asset** constraints, must reflect the availability of such energy by appropriately adjusting the **available capability** of such **long lead time generating asset** in order to have such energy **dispatched** according to the **energy market merit order**.

- d) The time of day and the adjustment to **available capability** as per **rules 6.3.5 b)** and **6.3.5 c)** must represent the physical condition of the **generating asset** as determined by either the time of the last notice of the **generating asset's** intention to start or the time of the last **dispatch off**, as it relates to the **operating constraint** submitted to the **ISO** under **rule 3.5.3.4**. The time of day and the adjustment to the **available capability** must be submitted at least two hours prior to the beginning of the **settlement interval**.
- e) In accordance with **ISO** Operating Policies and Procedures, the **system controller** may issue a **long lead time energy directive** to a **pool participant** to provide **long lead time energy** by a specified **settlement interval**, if the **adequacy** assessment pursuant to **ISO** Operating Policies and Procedures forecasts insufficient supply to meet **AIES demand** during and after such **settlement interval**. The **system controller** will cancel the **long lead time energy directive** once the **adequacy** assessment indicates there is sufficient supply to meet **AIES demand** in subsequent **settlement intervals**.
- f) A **pool participant** with a **long lead time generating asset**

	<p><u>that has received a <b>long lead time energy directive</b> may change the availability of the <b>long lead time energy</b> in accordance with <b>rules 6.3.5 b), 6.3.5 c) and 6.3.5 d)</b>. The <b>system controller</b> would then cancel the <b>long lead time energy directive</b> and <b>dispatch the long lead time generating asset</b> according to the <b>energy market merit order</b>. In such circumstances the <b>pool participant</b> will not be eligible for any compensation as described in Appendix 7, pursuant to such <b>long lead time energy directive</b>.</u></p>
<p><b>4. 6.3.6.2 Conditions for Dispatch Down Service Dispatch</b></p> <p>a) If at any time:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) the <b>system marginal price</b> is less than or equal to the <b>reference price</b>, and</li> <li>ii) a <b>source asset</b> has been issued a <b>transmission must-run dispatch</b> or <b>directive</b>, and</li> <li>iii) the <b>transmission must-run</b> quantity (MW) is greater than <b>constrained down directive</b> quantity (MW) as calculated by the <b>system controller</b>.</li> </ul> <p>then the <b>system controller</b> will <b>dispatch off operating blocks</b> in the <b>energy market merit order</b> that have offered eligible <b>DDS</b>.</p>	<p><b>4. 6.3.6.2 Conditions for Dispatch Down Service Dispatch</b></p> <p>a) If at any time:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) the <b>system marginal price</b> is less than or equal to the <b>reference price</b>, and</li> <li>ii) a <b>source asset</b> has been issued a <b>transmission must-run dispatch</b> or <b>directive</b> or a <u><b>long lead time generating asset</b> has been issued a <b>long lead time energy directive</b></u> or both, and</li> <li>iii) the sum of the <b>transmission must-run</b> quantity (MW) <u>and the <b>long lead time energy directive</b> quantity (MW)</u> is greater than <b>constrained down directive</b> quantity (MW) as calculated by the <b>system controller</b>.</li> </ul> <p>then the <b>system controller</b> will <b>dispatch off operating blocks</b> in the <b>energy market merit order</b> that have offered eligible <b>DDS</b>.</p>

<p>b) <b>Operating blocks</b> will not be <b>dispatched off</b> in the <b>energy market merit order</b> for <b>DDS</b> when the <b>system marginal price</b> is greater than the <b>reference price</b>.</p>	<p>b) <b>Operating blocks</b> will not be <b>dispatched off</b> in the <b>energy market merit order</b> for <b>DDS</b> when the <b>system marginal price</b> is greater than the <b>reference price</b>.</p>
<p><b>5. 6.3.6.3 Determining Dispatch Down Service Dispatch Quantity</b></p> <p>a) Subject to <b>rule 6.3.6.3 b)</b>, the <b>DDS dispatch quantity (MW)</b> is the lesser of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) the <b>transmission must-run</b> quantity (MW) less the <b>constrained down directive</b> quantity (MW). The <b>DDS dispatch</b> quantity (MW) cannot be less than zero MW.</li> <li>ii) the eligible quantity of <b>DDS offers</b>.</li> </ul> <p>b) <b>Operating blocks</b> in the <b>energy market merit order</b> that have been <b>dispatched off</b> for <b>DDS</b> will be <b>dispatched on</b> by the <b>system controller</b> prior to <b>dispatching operating blocks</b> that are greater than the <b>reference price</b>.</p>	<p><b>5. 6.3.6.3 Determining Dispatch Down Service Dispatch Quantity</b></p> <p>a) Subject to <b>rule 6.3.6.3 b)</b>, the <b>DDS dispatch quantity (MW)</b> is the lesser of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>i) the <b>transmission must-run</b> quantity (MW) and <a href="#"><u>the long lead time energy directive quantity (MW)</u></a> less the <b>constrained down directive</b> quantity (MW). The <b>DDS dispatch</b> quantity (MW) cannot be less than zero MW.</li> <li>ii) the eligible quantity of <b>DDS offers</b>.</li> </ul> <p>b) <b>Operating blocks</b> in the <b>energy market merit order</b> that have been <b>dispatched off</b> for <b>DDS</b> will be <b>dispatched on</b> by the <b>system controller</b> prior to <b>dispatching operating blocks</b> that are greater than the <b>reference price</b>.</p>
<p><b>6. 8.1.1 Settlement at Pool Price</b></p> <p>For each <b>source asset</b> and for each <b>settlement interval</b> the <b>pool participant</b> will receive the amount calculated by the following formula:</p> <p>Energy payment in \$ = ((<b>energy production</b> in MWh) minus</p>	<p><b>6. 8.1.1 Settlement at Pool Price</b></p> <p>For each <b>source asset</b> and for each <b>settlement interval</b> the <b>pool participant</b> will receive the amount calculated by the following formula:</p> <p>Energy payment in \$ = ((<b>energy production</b> in MWh) minus</p>



<p><b>(net settlement instruction MWh volumes in MWh))</b> multiplied by <b>(pool price in \$/MWh)</b></p> <p>where:</p> <p><b>“energy production in MWh”</b> is the <b>metered MWh</b> value for <b>generating assets</b> or the interchange <b>MWh</b> schedule across the <b>interconnection</b> for importing <b>assets</b>.</p> <p>If the <b>energy production in MWh</b> is less than the <b>net settlement instruction MWh volume</b> then the <b>pool participant</b> is deemed to have purchased the <b>MWh</b> volume difference from the <b>power pool</b>. The <b>pool participant</b> must pay to the <b>ISO</b> in respect of electric energy received by it in a <b>settlement interval</b> an amount equal to the energy payment.</p> <p>Payment for emergency energy production installed and producing during an emergency transmission outage outside of an energy market suspension event will be paid based on the energy payment calculation noted above.</p> <p>The calculation of payment for emergency energy production installed and producing during an emergency transmission outage outside of an energy market suspension event will be based on metered energy submitted to the <b>ISO</b> as per <b>rule 8.3.2 b)</b>.</p>	<p><b>(net settlement instruction MWh volumes in MWh))</b> multiplied by <b>(pool price in \$/MWh)</b></p> <p>where:</p> <p><b>“energy production in MWh”</b> is the <b>metered MWh</b> value for <b>generating assets</b> or the interchange <b>MWh</b> schedule across the <b>interconnection</b> for importing <b>assets</b>.</p> <p>If the <b>energy production in MWh</b> is less than the <b>net settlement instruction MWh volume</b> then the <b>pool participant</b> is deemed to have purchased the <b>MWh</b> volume difference from the <b>power pool</b>. The <b>pool participant</b> must pay to the <b>ISO</b> in respect of electric energy received by it in a <b>settlement interval</b> an amount equal to the energy payment.</p> <p>Payment for emergency energy production installed and producing during an emergency transmission outage outside of an energy market suspension event will be paid based on the energy payment calculation noted above.</p> <p>The calculation of payment for emergency energy production installed and producing during an emergency transmission outage outside of an energy market suspension event will be based on metered energy submitted to the <b>ISO</b> as per <b>rule 8.3.2 b)</b>.</p> <p><u>The calculation of payment for <b>energy production</b> installed and producing as a result of an <b>long lead time energy directive</b> outside of an <b>energy market suspension</b> event will be based on <b>metered energy</b> submitted to the <b>ISO</b> as per <b>rule 8.3.2 a)</b>. If</u></p>
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	<p><u>the pool participant’s total variable costs for the energy production are not fully recovered by rules 8.1.1 and 8.1.2, an additional payment will be paid based on the variable cost information submitted to the ISO as per the terms set forth in Appendix 7.</u></p>
<p><b>7. 8.4.2 Final Pool Statement</b></p> <p><b>g) Supply Shortfall Costs</b></p> <p>The <b>ISO</b> may charge an <b>ISO fee</b> to recover the costs associated with a <b>supply shortfall directive</b>. The contribution paid by a <b>pool participant</b> shall be determined by prorating the amount paid to the <b>pool participant</b> for the <b>generating asset</b> issued the <b>supply shortfall directive</b> over the total <b>energy consumption</b> of each <b>pool participant</b> during the <b>settlement intervals</b> where the supply shortfall energy was required. Where the <b>supply shortfall energy</b> was subsequently not required, the contribution paid by a <b>pool participant</b> shall be determined by prorating the amount paid to the <b>pool participant</b> for the <b>generating asset</b> issued the <b>supply shortfall directive</b> over the total <b>energy consumption</b> of each <b>pool participant</b> during the <b>settlement intervals</b> where the energy was forecast to be required. The supply shortfall costs will be invoiced with the <b>pool statement</b>.</p>	<p><b>7. 8.4.2 Final Pool Statement</b></p> <p><u>g) Long Lead Time Energy Directive Costs</u></p> <p><u>The ISO may charge an ISO fee to recover the costs associated with a long lead time energy directive. The contribution paid by a pool participant shall be determined by prorating the amount paid to the pool participant for the long lead generating asset issued the long lead time energy directive over the total energy consumption of each pool participant during the settlement intervals where the long lead time energy was required. Where the long lead time energy was subsequently not required, the contribution paid by a pool participant shall be determined by prorating the amount paid to the pool participant for the long lead generating asset issued the long lead time energy directive over the total energy consumption of each pool participant during the settlement intervals where the energy was forecast to be required. The long lead time energy costs will be invoiced with the pool statement.</u></p>
<p>New Appendix 7</p>	<p><b>APPENDIX 7 - COMPENSATION FOR LONG LEAD TIME ENERGY DIRECTIVES AND GENERATOR OUTAGE CANCELLATION OR RE-SCHEDULING AND</b></p>

## **REPORTING**

### **1.0 LONG LEAD TIME ENERGY DIRECTIVES**

#### **1.1 RIGHT TO DISPATCH**

The **system controller** may, in accordance with **rule 6.3.5 e)** of the main body of the **rules**, issue a **long lead time energy directive** to a **pool participant** to operate a **long lead time generating asset** that is not operating or scheduled to operate for reasons other than an **outage**.

#### **1.2 COMPENSATION FOR LONG LEAD TIME ENERGY DIRECTIVES**

##### **1.2.1 Compensation**

In the event a **pool participant** receives a **long lead time energy directive** to operate a **long lead time generating asset** that is not operating or scheduled to operate for reasons other than an **outage** and the **pool participant** did not recover the **Variable Costs** for such **long lead time generating asset** from all revenue received or receivable by such **pool participant** from the **power pool** associated with the **energy production** generated by such **long lead time generating asset** in response to a **long lead time energy directive**, the **ISO** will pay the **pool participant** the **Variable Costs** for such **generating asset**, where:

a) Variable Costs is the hourly difference of the **pool price**

- subtracted from the Energy Price, which shall not be less than zero, multiplied by the corresponding hourly energy generated (MWh) by the specific directed **long lead time generating generating asset** in compliance with the **long lead time directive**
- b) Energy Price (\$/MWh) is the product of the Heat Rate multiplied by the Fuel Cost, added to the sum of the Variable STS Charges and Variable O&M Charge
  - c) Heat Rate (GJ/MWh) is the actual heat rate of the **pool participant's long lead time generating asset** during the period when such **asset** was complying with the **long lead time energy directive**
  - d) Fuel Cost for a natural gas **generating asset** is the natural gas market price (\$/GJ), being the "Daily Spot Price at AECO-C and NIT", excluding weekends, as published in the Canadian Gas Price Reporter, for natural gas on the applicable day.
  - e) Variable STS Charges (\$/MWh) is the actual cost of all variable charges from Rate Schedule STS of the **ISO tariff**, including the applicable **loss factor** charge or credit.
  - f) Variable Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Charge (\$/MWh) is the all-in cost (including major/minor overhauls), fixed at \$4/MWh, of providing incremental output from the **long lead time generating asset**, excluding Fuel Costs and Variable STS charges.
- The **ISO** will pay Variable Costs in each instance and notwithstanding any term in this Appendix to the contrary, for the period of time such **long lead time generating asset** was **directed on** to the time it was **directed off** and provided energy in accordance with an **long lead time energy directive** and

otherwise in accordance with the **ISO rules**.

### **1.2.2 No Additional Compensation**

Except as set forth in **rule 2.1** of this Appendix, there will be no compensation or consideration given to the **pool participant** for start-ups of **long lead time generating assets** directed to generate **energy production** pursuant to a **long lead time energy directive**. Notwithstanding any term of this Appendix to the contrary, in no event will any such **pool participant** be entitled to or be compensated for:

- a) indirect, incidental, consequential or special damages;
- b) lost opportunity due to a change in market operation timelines;
- c) fixed operating costs, fixed maintenance costs or other fixed costs associated with such **long lead time generating asset**;  
or
- d) costs contemplated or covered by a contract between the **pool participant** and the **ISO**.

in each case, arising out of or relating to the **pool participant** complying with an **long lead time energy directive**.

### **1.2.3 Financial Settlement**

Where a **long lead time generating asset** has generated **energy production** in accordance with an **long lead time energy directive**, then:

a) within 15 business days after the end of the month in which such energy was provided, such **pool participant** will issue to the **ISO** a statement showing:

(i) amounts owing or owed as calculated in accordance with this Appendix along with supporting documentation; and

(ii) such other information as the **ISO** considers appropriate;

(iii) any disputes in respect of any such statement shall be resolved in accordance with the provisions or **rules 8.5 b), 8.5 c), 8.5 d) and 8.5 e)** of the main body of the **ISO rules** applied *mutatis mutandis* on the basis that the **ISO** is the disputing party in respect of a statement provided by a **pool participant** pursuant to **rule 2.3 a)** above.

## **2.0 GENERATOR OUTAGE CANCELLATION OR RESCHEDULING**

### **2.1 RIGHT TO DISPATCH**

The **system controller** may, in accordance with **rule 5.1.2** of the main body of the **ISO rules**, provide a **directive** (in this Appendix, an “outage direction”) to a **pool participant** to cancel or re-schedule an **outage** for a **generating asset** owned by such

pool participant and to operate such generating asset.

## 2.2 COMPENSATION FOR GENERATOR OUTAGE CANCELLATION OR RESCHEDULING

### 2.2.1 Compensation

The ISO will pay the pool participant, in respect of generating assets affected by the cancellation or re-scheduling of an outage an amount equal to the sum, without duplication, of the following:

- a) costs incurred by such pool participant associated with cancelling an outage and, in accordance with good electric operating practice, re-scheduling the personnel, equipment and other materials required for the performance of the work originally to be completed or performed pursuant to the cancelled or re-scheduled outage; plus
- b) reasonable costs incurred by such pool participant pursuant to a contract entered into by such pool participant with a third party respecting the maintenance of the subject generating asset;

in each case, as a result of the cancellation or re-scheduling of an outage pursuant to rule 5.1.2.

### 2.2.2 No Additional Compensation

Except as set forth in rule 6.1 of this Appendix, there will be no compensation or consideration given to the **pool participant** for cancellation or re-scheduling of **outages** in accordance with rule 5.1.2 of the main body of the **ISO rules**. Notwithstanding any term of this Appendix to the contrary, in no event will any such **pool participant** be entitled to or be compensated for:

- a) indirect, incidental, consequential or special damages;
- b) lost opportunity costs;
- c) fixed operating costs, fixed maintenance costs or other fixed costs associated with such **generating asset**;
- d) costs contemplated or covered by a contract between the **pool participant** and the **ISO**.

in each case arising out of or relating to the cancellation or re-scheduling of an **outage**.

### 2.2.3 Financial Settlement

Where an **outage** in respect of a **generating asset** has been cancelled or re-scheduled in accordance with an **outage directive**, then:

a) within 15 **business days** after the end of any relevant **settlement period**, such **pool participant** will issue to the **ISO** a statement showing:

(i) amounts owing or owed as calculated in accordance with **rule 6.1** of this Appendix; and

(ii) such other information as the **ISO** considers appropriate;

b) the **pool participant** will provide to the **ISO** the supporting data used in determining the amount specified in any such statement, such information to include (if applicable) the costs, charges and other items specified in **rule 6.1** of this Appendix; and

c) any disputes in respect of any such settlement shall be resolved in accordance with the provisions of **rules 8.5 b)**, **8.5 c)**, **8.5 d)** and **8.5 e)** of the main body of the **ISO rules** applied *mutatis mutandis* on the basis that the **ISO** is the disputing party in respect of a statement provided by a **pool participant** pursuant to **rule 6.3 a)** of this Appendix.

### **3.0 REPORTING**

In the event the **ISO** is required to cancel or re-schedule a **generating asset's outage** or issue a **long lead time energy directive** the **ISO** will prepare a report to be made public on the **AESO** website. Such report may include:

- a) identity of affected **pool participant**.
- b) identity of affected **generating asset**.
- c) compensation requested by affected **pool participant**.
- d) compensation paid by the **ISO**.
- e) the circumstances that caused and related to the re-scheduling or cancellation of an **outage** or the issuance of **a long lead time energy directive**, (e.g., date, duration, quantities (MW) affected).
- f) chronological events and market impacts