

Energy Market Power Mitigation

Energy & Ancillary Services Workgroup

Meeting 3

May 3, 2018

- Received comments from last work group meeting
 - Some were considered in CMD2
 - Others for discussion today
- Issues for discussion today
 - Scarcity and graduated RSI approach
 - Timing
 - Obligations in the residual supplier index formula
 - Elements of the residual supplier index formula and the supply cushion calculation
 - Reporting
- Feedback following today's meeting

Scarcity and graduated RSI approach

Scarcity and graduated RSI approach

- No-look scarcity test in CMD2
 - If the supply cushion is forecast to be less than 500 MW there will be no mitigation
- At the last work group meeting, some stakeholders raised the possibility of using a graduated approach implementing the no-look scarcity test
 - E.g., an intermediate step between the market power screen being $RSI = 1$ when the supply cushion is 500 MW or greater and no mitigation when the supply cushion is less than 500 MW
- The AESO continues to evaluate the potential this idea, including how it would interact with other elements of the market power mitigation framework

Timing

Timing: CMD2 and some stakeholder comments

- The AESO has proposed to implement mitigation “after T-2”
 - The market-side no-look scarcity test would be implemented first and, based on the results, the market power screen would be applied on a firm-by-firm basis
- Previously received stakeholder feedback
 - Some stakeholders have suggested that mitigation be implemented, if at all, as close to the beginning of the delivery hour as possible
 - Better information about the nature of the delivery hour
 - Some stakeholders have suggested that mitigation occur in advance of T-2
 - Argument that there could be a response from market participants

- Whenever it is implemented, the AESO will need to have the data necessary to calculate / forecast the supply cushion and RSI
 - The AESO information about delivery hour t is more accurate (less uncertain) as the hour approaches
 - In any event, the process will only be run once for each delivery hour, i.e., if market circumstances change thereafter the results will not be updated
- Proposal: the AESO will run the market power mitigation process as soon as practicable before the beginning of the delivery hour
- How the AESO will inform the market and specific market participants of the results is a reporting matter (below)

Elements of the residual supplier index formula and the supply cushion calculation

- The calculation of the supply cushion and RSI is required to implement the objective of having a screen that measures structural market power and mitigates it when appropriate
 - CMD2 rationale document provided significantly more context, detail, and discussion
- There are many ways to measure common variables
 - For example, regarding measures of demand, AIL is not equal to the sum of energy dispatched from the Merit Order Snapshot Energy report
- Data must be fit for purpose
 - There are trade-offs regarding the data
 - Current or new data

Elements of the RSI formula

- The residual supplier index for market participant i in delivery hour t is set out in the following formula:

$$RSI_{it} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^n Supply_{jt} + Import\ Capability_t - (Supply_{it} + Imports_{it} - Obligation_{it})}{Total\ Alberta\ Demand_t + Exports_t}$$

- The first two terms in the numerator is the sum of all supply that is available to the market
 - The last three terms in the numerator is market participant i 's net exposure to the pool price (supply net of obligations)
 - Obligations will be discussed separately (below)
 - The denominator is total demand in the market
- As the RSI is used on a forward-looking basis, the elements of the formula are forecast values

Elements of the supply cushion calculation

- The supply cushion in delivery hour t is:

$$\text{Supply Cushion}_t = \text{Total Supply}_t - \text{Total Demand}_t$$

- As the supply cushion is used on a forward-looking basis, the elements of the formula are forecast values

- The data used in the calculation of the supply cushion and RSI is similar
 - For instance, both equations use the concept of total demand
 - There are many ways to measure demand
 - AIL and offers dispatched from the merit order are not equivalent (the latter is lower)
 - The measures of supply and demand should be measured in a comparable way

Discussion of specific data used


- What supply data should the AESO use?
 - How should wind be treated?
 - Some wind is part of large portfolios
 - How should long lead time units be treated?
 - Not on outage; but not available for dispatch
- What measure of demand should the AESO use?
 - AESO publishes day-ahead forecast AIL
 - But greater accuracy is possible just before the beginning of the delivery hour and so this could be updated

Obligations in the residual supplier index formula

Obligations: Impact of including obligations in RSI formula

- Inclusion of obligations can materially impact the RSI calculation
- The figure on the next slide illustrates the impact of including various obligation quantities in the RSI for the largest firm
 - Point A: With $RSI = 0.9$ and no supply obligations, the RSI test would be failed in ~25% of hours
 - Point B: With $RSI = 1$ and no supply obligations, the RSI test would be failed in ~65% of hours
 - Point C: With $RSI = 1$ and 1,000 MW of supply obligations (~one-quarter of its capacity), the RSI test would be failed in ~25% of hours
 - Point D: With $RSI = 1$ and 2,000 MW of supply obligations (~one-half of its capacity), the RSI test would be failed in ~1% of hours
 - Point E: With $RSI = 0.9$ and 1,000 MW of supply obligations, the RSI test would be failed in ~1% of hours

Obligations: Impact of including obligations in RSI formula



Obligations: CMD2 and some stakeholder comments

- The AESO has proposed that firms be allowed to voluntarily submit supply obligation data for inclusion in the RSI calculation
 - Proposal was that “physical” supply obligations be allowed
- There are broader definitions of supply obligation
 - Could include all financial obligations
 - These obligations also reduce the incentive to exercise market power to raise the pool price
- Would it be possible to measure all obligations? Can these data be audited?
- Are there adverse effects? E.g., market manipulation?

Obligations: Proposal

- Market participant specific
- Voluntary
- Physical and financial obligations are eligible
 - Affiliate or other related-party transactions are ineligible
 - Conduct that evades the mitigation framework is market manipulation that results in non-competitive market outcomes
- Requirement would be that the claimed obligation be no greater than the actual obligation
 - The market participant would not be required to state precisely what are its obligations; they must not be less than the submitted value
 - Market participant would be responsible to ensure that information is accurate

Reporting

- The AESO has said that it “may provide reports on ex ante market power mitigation” (CMD2 Proposal, section 10.7.5)
- Reporting can take a variety of forms
 - Forward-looking variables
 - Backward-looking outcomes (i.e., things that happened)

Reporting:

Information related to future delivery hours

- Information is available to help market participants form an expectation about whether mitigation is likely to occur
 - AESO published the Supply Adequacy Report
 - Hourly data for all hours of today and the next six days
 - Related to the market-wide no-look scarcity test
 - Is the definition of supply cushion consistent?
 - AESO publishes ATC information, outage information, and demand forecasts for various periods
 - Related to the calculation of RSI
 - Are definitions consistent?
- Firms will have the data necessary to calculate their own asset-specific reference prices

Reporting: Outcomes from the mitigation framework

- Backward-looking outcomes (i.e., things that happened)
 - The market-wide no-look scarcity test
 - Publicly available
 - Firm-specific RSI calculations
 - Only available to the relevant firm
 - Asset-specific mitigation of offer prices
 - Only available to the relevant firm
- AESO published the Merit Order Snapshot – Energy (MOSR)
 - 60 days after delivery hour
 - Contains offer prices (and other information)
 - If an offer price was mitigated, this would be the price that is reported in the MOSR

Questions?

Thank You