

# Alberta Reliability Standard

## System Performance Following Extreme BES Events

### TPL-004-AB-0



#### 1. Purpose

The purpose of this **reliability standard** is to ensure that a reliable transmission system is planned that meets specified performance requirements with sufficient lead time. The transmission system must continue to be modified or upgraded as required to meet present and future system specified performance requirements as identified by periodically performed system simulations and associated planning assessments.

#### 2. Applicability

This **reliability standard** applies to:

- (a) **ISO**

#### 3. Definitions

Bold terms used in this **reliability standard** have the meanings as set out in the [Consolidated Authoritative Document Glossary](#) and Part 1 of the [ISO Rules](#).

#### 4. Requirements

**R1** The ISO must demonstrate for transmission facilities rated 100 kV and above, through a planning assessment that a transmission system is planned such that it has been evaluated for the risks and consequences of a number of each of the extreme contingencies that are listed under Category D of Appendix 1.

The **ISO** planning assessments must:

**R1.1** Be carried out annually.

**R1.2** Be conducted for near term (year one through five).

**R1.3** Be supported by a study and/or system simulation that addresses each of the following categories, showing system performance following Category D **contingencies** of Appendix 1.

**R1.3.1** Be performed and evaluated only for those Category D **contingencies** that **ISO** determines would produce the more severe system results or impacts. The rationale for the **contingencies** selected for evaluation and an explanation of why the remaining simulations would produce less severe system results must be included in the study.

**R1.3.2** Cover critical system conditions and study years as considered necessary by the **ISO**.

**R1.3.3** Be conducted annually unless the **ISO** determines that changes to system conditions do not warrant such analyses.

**R1.3.4** Have all projected firm transfers modeled, if any.

**R1.3.5** Include existing and planned **facilities** as considered necessary by the **ISO**.

**R1.3.6** Include **reactive power** resources to ensure that adequate reactive resources are available to meet system performance.

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**R1.3.7** Include the effects of existing and planned **protection systems**, including any backup or redundant systems.

**R1.3.8** Include the effects of existing and planned control devices.

**R1.3.9** Include the planned **outage** and maintenance of any bulk electric equipment (including **protection systems** or their components) at those **demand** levels for which planned (including maintenance) **outages** are performed. This requirement applies only to **BES facilities** greater than 200 kV or other **facilities** as specified by the **ISO**.

**R1.4** Consider all **contingencies** applicable to Category D of Appendix 1.

**R2** The **ISO** must provide the planning assessment to **WECC** on an annual basis.

## 5. Processes and Procedures

No procedures have been defined for this **reliability standard**.

## 6. Measures

The following measures correspond to the requirements identified in Section 4 of this **reliability standard**. For example, MR1 is the measure for R1.

**MR1** The planning assessment will be valid and meet requirement in R1 and associated sub-sections through the following measures:

- (a) The scope of the planning assessment identifies where area studies have been conducted in the past year. It also identifies area studies that have been conducted in previous years and are still valid. Where area studies have not been conducted, a plan and schedule to conduct one is included in the planning assessment.
- (b) The planning assessment includes time horizons as specified in R1.2.
- (c) The planning assessment has been prepared within the last year.
- (d) A certification that the planning assessment complies with each of the R1 technical requirements is provided and states that the planning assessment meets all requirements, identifies requirements not met, and states reasons where the requirement was not met.
- (e) A summary list of supporting area studies and needs identification documents is provided. The summary list includes the title and date of the study. The area studies and needs identification documents are provided if requested.

**MR2** A written or email confirmation from **WECC** that it has received the planning assessment from the **ISO**. The confirmation includes the date of when the planning assessment was received and source identification information.

## 7. Appendices

**Appendix 1 - Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions** (see below)

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## 8. Guidelines

No guidelines have been defined for this **reliability standard**.

### Revision History

Date	Description
2010-09-24	Initial release.
2016-08-30	Inclusion of the defined term <b>system element</b> .

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## Appendix 1 - Transmission System Standards – Normal and Emergency Conditions

Category	Contingencies	System Limits or Impacts		
	Initiating Event(s) and Contingency <b>System Element(s)</b>	System Stable and Both Thermal and Voltage Limits Within Applicable <b>Rating<sup>a</sup></b>	Loss of <b>Demand</b> or Curtailed Firm Transmission Service Transfers	<b>Cascading</b>
<b>A</b> No contingencies	All <b>facilities</b> in service	Yes	No	No
<b>B</b> Event resulting in the loss of a single <b>system element</b>	Single Line Ground (SLG) or 3-Phase (3Ø) fault, with <b>normal clearing</b> :	Yes	No <sup>b</sup>	No
	1. Generator	Yes	No <sup>b</sup>	No
	2. Transmission circuit	Yes	No <sup>b</sup>	No
	3. Transformer	Yes	No <sup>b</sup>	No
<b>C</b> Event(s) resulting in the loss of two or more (multiple) <b>system elements</b>	SLG fault, with <b>normal clearing<sup>e</sup></b> :			
	1. Bus section	Yes	Planned/ Controlled <sup>c</sup>	No
	2. Breaker (failure or internal fault)	Yes	Planned/ Controlled <sup>c</sup>	No
	SLG or 3Ø fault, with <b>normal clearing<sup>e</sup></b> , manual system adjustments, followed by another SLG or 3Ø fault, with <b>normal clearing<sup>e</sup></b>			
	3. Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) <b>contingency</b> , manual system adjustments, followed by another Category B (B1, B2, B3, or B4) <b>contingency</b>	Yes	Planned/ Controlled <sup>c</sup>	No
	Bipolar block, with <b>normal clearing<sup>e</sup></b> :			
4. Bipolar (dc) line fault (non 3Ø), with <b>normal clearing<sup>e</sup></b> :	Yes	Planned/ Controlled <sup>c</sup>	No	
5. Any two circuits of a multiple circuit towerline <sup>t</sup>	Yes	Planned/ Controlled <sup>c</sup>	No	
	SLG fault, with delayed clearing <sup>e</sup> (stuck breaker or <b>protection system</b> failure)			



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adjustments are permitted, including curtailments of contracted firm (non-recallable reserved) transmission service electric power transfers.

- c) Depending on system design and expected system impacts, the controlled interruption of electric supply to customers (**load** shedding), the planned removal from service of certain generators, and/or the curtailment of contracted firm (non-recallable reserved) transmission service electric power transfers may be necessary to maintain the overall **reliability** of the **interconnected** transmission systems.
- d) A number of extreme **contingencies** that are listed under Category D and judged to be critical by the transmission planning entity(ies) will be selected for evaluation. It is not expected that all possible **facility outages** under each listed **contingency** of Category D will be evaluated.
- e) **Normal clearing** is when the **protection system** operates as designed and the fault is cleared in the time normally expected with proper functioning of the installed **protection systems**. Delayed clearing of a fault is due to failure of any **protection system** component such as a relay, circuit breaker, or current transformer, and not because of an intentional design delay.
- f) System assessments may exclude these events where multiple circuit towers are used over short distances (i.e., station entrance, river crossings) in accordance with exemption criteria.